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Abstract. This paper seeks to understand whether the alignment process between business strategy and Corporate Real 
Estate (CRE) between 2007 and 2014 was dynamic. It investigated the financial data of 230 UK companies by means of a 
distributed time lag auto-regression model. The results show an increased commitment to CRE suggesting a reduced abil-
ity to dynamically align the portfolio. Evidence is found that CRE adjusts as turnover, profitability and employment num-
bers alter. However, measures of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity are not improving. The new business strategies 
of transient competitive advantage and blue ocean strategy require flexible resources, which require CRE to be capable of 
dynamic alignment. This study shows such flexibility does not yet exist in practice. Current theories of alignment should be 
reconsidered in light of the changing business environment. Without a dynamic alignment capability of CRE a company’s 
financial performance will be impaired.
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Introduction
The direction a business takes is, to a large extent, deter-
mined by its strategy. Strategic concepts exist for a long 
time, as techniques taught in business school stay with 
a manager throughout their professional life. Sustained 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985) is a strategic concept 
that continues to have a long-lasting impact because of its 
widespread adoption by business schools. However, the 
financial crisis and recession (2007 to 2014) forced busi-
nesses to adjust rapidly and develop a ‘new norm’. This 
norm is increasingly based on continual change, not the 
steady state that Porter assumed, making ‘change’ itself a 
significant factor in business strategy (McGrath, 2013).
Change continues to be disruptive, with volatility and 
uncertainty ensuring that there are only short periods 
of competitive advantage before change occurs. McGrath 
(2013) suggests that Porter’s concept has evolved into 
transient competitive advantage. Disruption itself can cre-
ate new business areas, blue oceans, where business has a 
sustained competitive advantage for a longer period than in 
existing markets (Kim & Maugborgne, 2015).
A fundamental aspect of Porter’s approach is that 
business has to manage its individual operational ele-
ments to improve margins. Resources can be physical as-
sets or less tangible concepts, such as knowledge, and can 
be leveraged to build an advantage and with it ‘strategic 
intent’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). CRE is real estate “that 
house(s) the productive or business activities of an organi-
sation” (CoreNet Global, 2015, p. 1), as such it is a physical 
asset of the firm, supporting the main business objectives 
but incidental to them. The way that it is acquired and 
managed is part of the firms’ knowledge pool, which can 
provide a benefit that is difficult to replicate, and thus, in 
itself, is a competitive advantage (Park & Glascock, 2010). 
CRE is generally of secondary importance within an or-
ganisation to its ‘people’ and provides a supporting role 
to them. Accordingly, CRE managers face various issues 
and have to make trade-offs that impact their decisions 
on CRE issues.
A significant focus of CRE research has been the de-
velopment of CRE models. However, none of the papers 
consider how the CRE portfolio adjusts relative to change 
of the organisation, its financial performance or business 
strategy. Papers that consider CRE and its management 
use measures that are narrow tactical definitions (e.g. 
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reduce costs) rather than broader strategic performance 
ones. Van Ree (2002) created definitions that link CRE 
with the business overall and have been adopted in this 
paper as they will resonate with business decision-makers 
as well as CRE managers. The objective of this research 
is to look at the extent of adjustment and adaption of the 
CRE portfolio to changes in turnover, profitability and 
employee numbers during a recession. That process of 
CRE realignment needs to be dynamic and continual, not 
a one-off event. The authors have defined the process as 
dynamic alignment of CRE. This is a knowledge gap that 
is addressed in this paper.
Longitudinal CRE research has been limited. Studies 
have focussed on stock market performance as the relative 
balance of owned to leased CRE has changed. Rodriguez 
and Sirmans (1996) found that CRE could have a positive 
impact on stock market perception under various scenar-
ios and more recent studies (e.g. Lasfer, 2007; Liow, 2004) 
have had similar outcomes. However, these studies do not 
consider the financial performance of a business and the 
impact on its CRE flexibility. Rather they consider finan-
cial performance through stock market returns, in par-
ticular how changes to the owned:leased ratio has affected 
investor sentiment. Longitudinal studies on how compa-
nies have translated significant change in their business 
environment into CRE flexibility and decision-making do 
not appear to have been carried out.
This study examines financial and CRE data collated 
from the financial accounts of companies in the FTSE350 
over eight years during a period of significant change. Us-
ing a distributed time lag auto-regression model evidence 
has been sought of the relationship between financial per-
formance and CRE flexibility to provide evidence of the 
link of dynamic alignment of CRE (or the lack thereof) to 
the business strategy. Three hypotheses are tested to seek 
to establish how CRE was realigned.
The remainder of the paper starts with a literature re-
view, which considers changes to business strategy and its 
influence on CRE, especially CRE performance measure-
ment. Next, the development of the hypotheses is outlined 
through sub-hypotheses and is followed by the methodol-
ogy adopted. Finally, the results and their discussion are 
followed by a conclusion that considers the implications 
for academics and practitioners and suggestions for fur-
ther work.
1. Literature review
Business strategy is not a homogenous subject but has a 
wide range of different approaches (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, 
& Lampel, 2009). One of the most influential concepts 
has been that of sustained competitive advantage (Por-
ter, 1985), and its development, the Resource-based View 
(RBV) (Barney, 1991). A business manages its value chain, 
comprising both primary activities (operations, logistics, 
marketing, etc.) and support activities (infrastructure, HR, 
etc.) to improve the profit margin and increase the com-
petitive advantage. Managers have to focus on efficiency 
and effectiveness of the individual elements to drive the 
profit margin. However, the business environment has 
evolved, it now only offers a transient competitive advan-
tage (McGrath, 2013) resulting from change and innova-
tion, leading to different approaches such as blue ocean 
strategy (Kim & Maugborgne, 2015).
Flexibility of CRE is essential to operate within a busi-
ness environment that offers transient competitive advan-
tage and/or to allow a firm to be empowered to consider 
blue ocean strategies. Even if the strategic approach re-
mains as sustained competitive advantage, “firms wishing 
to obtain above-normal returns must have better foresight 
than rivals” (Kunc & Morecroft, 2010, p. 1166). Grantham, 
Ware, and Williamson (2007) argued that the organisa-
tional view of space has changed from a focus on place 
to one on work itself. Consequently, there is a need for 
less but more efficient superior quality space. Dispensing 
with CRE altogether is generally not a realistic option, 
but corporate agility needs to be matched by CRE agil-
ity. CRE managers need the ability to dynamically realign 
their CRE portfolio in response to planned and unfore-
seen changes, dynamic alignment.
Business strategy develops and evolves over time. The 
influence of internal and external factors results in strat-
egy development and its implementation not being a con-
trolled deliberate process, but rather an emergent complex 
iterative process (Mintzberg & Water, 1985). Decision-
making should improve over time providing closer align-
ment of CRE to operational needs, as well as other parts 
of the business, and therefore dynamic alignment of CRE 
should be evident.
However, the lack of attention by corporate strate-
gic management researchers on CRE issues, (identified 
by Roulac, 2001) remains pertinent today (Heywood & 
Kenley, 2008). The linkage between business and CRE has 
been stated as being poor from both business strategy and 
CRE research perspectives. Heywood (2011) suggested 
that alignment models were too CRE focused whereas 
Stadlhofer suggested that in Europe, “CRE has almost en-
tirely been seen as a cost factor” (Stadlhofer, 2010, p. 97). 
In conclusion, some CRE research appears too business 
focussed (Scheffer, Singer, & Meerwijk, 2006), other too 
CRE centric, but all indicate a poor link with business.
A body of CRE research has focussed on modelling 
the alignment of the CRE portfolio with business strategy 
(e.g. Nourse & Roulac, 1993; De Jonge, 1996 (cited by Ap-
pel-Meulenbroek, Brown, & Ramakers, 2010); Lindholm, 
Nenonen, & Gibler, 2006b). Despite the different catego-
risations of possible CRE strategies, many agree that the 
fundamental driver for business strategy is to ‘maximise 
wealth of shareholders’ (e.g. Gibler & Lindholm, 2012). 
That may hold true for a number of organisations, but it is 
not a universal proposition. A more complex set of influ-
ences can operate during decision making processes, in-
cluding the self-interest of managers and corporate social 
responsibility (Mintzberg, Simons, & Basu, 2002).
Heywood and Kenley (2008) considered how opera-
tional decisions could provide an advantage through func-
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tional strategies but recognised that they could generate 
contradictory effects. Heywood and Arkesteijn (2017) 
examined 20 different CRE alignment models conclud-
ing that the theoretical base of the subject is disorgan-
ised. More importantly, CRE alignment is “pluralistic and 
complex, being several things simultaneously” (Heywood 
& Arkesteijn, 2017, p. 155). In an earlier study, Heywood 
(2011) concluded that none of the existing (ten) models 
had all the necessary components. These various studies 
consider the model itself, not the dynamics that impact 
the CRE portfolio, and they illustrate how individual CRE 
tactical decisions can influence business performance. The 
primary flow of decision-making is one directional; busi-
ness strategy directs CRE strategy, which steers CRE deci-
sions, the effects of which flow back into various business 
metrics. For example, to reduce CRE costs leases will not 
be renewed leading to an increase in profits from lower 
expenditure. Those CRE models that have been devel-
oped have considered various aspects of CRE including 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the CRE Manager (e.g. 
Nourse & Roulac, 1993); the alignment of CRE with busi-
ness strategy (e.g. Lindholm et al., 2006b; Haynes, 2012; 
Heywood, 2011); the own versus lease decision (e.g. Tip-
ping & Bullard, 2007); company performance (e.g. Nappi-
Choulet, Missonier-Piera, & Cancel, 2009) and how CRE 
affects stock market performance (e.g. Lasfer, 2007).
Business decision-making is theoretically linked to 
business strategy, the latter provides the direction of travel 
for the company and decisions should support its objec-
tives. Good decisions add value, whereas unrectified, bad 
decisions lose value. “Ultimately, a company’s value is no 
more (and no less) than the sum of the decisions it makes 
and executes” (Blenko, Mankins, & Rogers, 2010, p. 57). 
What is essential for managing resources is the measure-
ment of the performance of the business, and its constitu-
ent parts (Neely & Bourne, 2000; Neely, 2005; Tangen, 
2005). The measurement systems used need to be defined 
and explained and related to what their intention is, the 
improvement of the performance (Tangen, 2005).
Van Ree proposed that, “the profitability or perfor-
mance of an organisation depends to a great extent on 
meeting the generic performance criteria” (Van Ree, 
2002, p. 357). This generic framework provides a broader 
perspective than other models that have been developed 
and provides a link between business and CRE measures. 
These are:
 – Effectiveness – the actual result achieved against the 
aimed for result;
 – Efficiency – aimed for resource use against actual re-
sourced used;
 – Productivity – actual output to input;
 – Flexibility  – “the ability to recognise and adapt to 
changing circumstances” (Van Ree, 2002, p. 359).
These measures are qualitative and quantitative and 
business will need to choose which element has priority 
at a specific time. Ultimately though there will be a bal-
ance reflecting short and long-term goals of the business. 
Subsequent researchers have sought to develop the con-
cept and have additionally suggested sustainability (Rira-
tanaphong & Van der Voordt, 2015) and IT (Stegerean & 
Gavrea, 2009). Others have structured a model along the 
lines of the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
for example Lindholm et al. (2006b) who produced nar-
rower tactical definitions.
Cost reduction is often regarded as the default strategy 
for CRE (Gibson & Lizieri, 2001), as “reducing cost in any 
area has a direct and immediate impact on the financial 
performance of the firm” (Lindholm, Gibler, & Levainen, 
2006a, p. 468). Cost reduction looks at efficiency only, 
the lowest input for a given output, it does not provide a 
wider perspective. On the other hand, effectiveness and 
productivity require consideration of both outputs and 
inputs together with their relative change. If demand falls 
the output needs to be adjusted downwards to reflect it, 
reducing the inputs required. The challenge of the ‘CRE 
input’ is that it can be relatively fixed. Declining output 
cannot be matched by an immediate reduction in the CRE 
input, which will have a negative effect on effectiveness, 
efficiency and productivity measures until the dynamic 
alignment process is completed.
Today’s more fluid business environment requires 
rapid adjustment in a short period of time to make a con-
tribution to strategy. The ability to change the dynamic 
tension between short time horizons (which require agil-
ity) and long-term strategic commitments (such as CRE) 
is now a required competency (Doz & Kosenen, 2008). 
Change and disruption require frequent re-calibration to 
re-align the business and maintain transient competitive 
advantage (McGrath, 2013), namely being lean and mean. 
Similarly, MacIntosh and MacLean (2015) stressed the re-
quirement for double-loop learning (an emergent process) 
and continual adjustment.
Consequently, a fixed CRE portfolio is an impediment 
to business change and, therefore, its performance. Joroff 
and Becker (2017) identified the move to an agile portfolio 
as one of six primary shifts in CRE over the last twenty-
five years. The move from static to agile portfolios reflects 
that “agility has become an overreaching objective” (Joroff 
& Becker, 2017, p. 33). Adaptability that results from a 
flexible CRE portfolio allows a business to change strat-
egy to deal with threats or exploit opportunities that arise, 
or to recalibrate its operations and costs to maintain its 
efficiency and effectiveness. This requires short term oc-
cupational arrangements (licences, short leases and fre-
quent, unfettered break clauses) or ownership. Legal and 
financial flexibility are two separate influencers of dynamic 
alignment and need to be explicitly stated, not implicitly 
dealt with (Gibson, 2000).
There has been a long running debate within CRE 
as to what offers business the greater flexibility, leasing 
or owning. Gibson suggested that owning a property is 
the only way to get total control, as “a lease always has 
both contractual and financial constraints” (Gibson, 2000, 
p. 152). Apgar (2009) took the opposite view that business 
needs to be nimble, therefore, own less and lease more, 
provided flexibility is built into the lease. Both arguments 
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have a measure of validity and are not mutually exclusive; 
a nimble organisation will seek the least burdensome op-
tion for their specific business. A detailed review of the 
advantages and disadvantages is provided by Haynes and 
Nunnington (2010), who identified the importance of cul-
tural, financial and business factors in the choice. The bal-
ance between owning and leasing has been discussed in a 
number of papers, but those studies have generally been 
from the perspective of total returns for shareholders (e.g. 
Lasfer, 2007). In practice, there is the reality of having to 
deal with the availability of supply, requirements for spe-
cialised facilities, the attitude of landlords, break clause 
restrictions, etc.
2. Hypothesis development
If managers seek competitive advantage they should focus 
on effectiveness, efficiency, productivity and flexibility as 
readily ascertainable performance measures. They should 
recognise that the business, including its CRE, is a com-
plex adaptive system (Reeves, Levin, & Ueda, 2016), which 
should be learning from past decisions. The outcome of 
that learning should be a more flexible CRE portfolio, 
capable of dynamic alignment to meet the future needs 
of business. Therefore, during any downturn in business 
performance the CRE portfolio should be capable of rapid 
adjustment, in particular, a reduction of capacity. A rela-
tively short lease profile will provide inherent flexibility 
allowing change to be achieved without creating a surplus 
leasehold property.
As managers seek to extract more from the value chain 
they will seek to generate more from less. The CRE port-
folio should reduce as a consequence of improvements in 
efficiency, effectiveness and productivity, assuming no ex-
ternal drivers of change (e.g. acquisitions, mergers, etc.). 
A business will seek to generate more turnover and profit 
from less space. Allied to that will be the decision on the 
split between owned and leased space, what is best for the 
business. Therefore, a flexible CRE portfolio capable of dy-
namic alignment is required.
The adjustment of CRE, including the balance between 
leased and owned CRE, to reflect business performance 
changes between 2007 to 2014 could indicate how CRE 
flexibility and its capacity for dynamic alignment operates 
in practice. This period is chosen for this study because 
during the eight years business was subject to the impact 
of a financial crisis followed by a recession and then re-
covery. The resulting turbulence and financial pressures 
meant that businesses had to react to the instability by 
changing their strategy. With the change(s) to business 
strategy there should have been a corresponding re-align-
ment of the CRE portfolio and evidence of dynamic align-
ment should be seen.
Three hypotheses have been identified to test for the 
existence of flexibility and capability for dynamic align-
ment, to allow the CRE to facilitate improved efficiency, 
effectiveness and productivity in the business.
Adopting the sustained competitive advantage approach 
(Porter, 1985) to strategy would assume that resources are 
worked harder to improve the value chain, therefore, over 
time, the business would get more from its CRE portfolio. 
From the perspective of transient competitive advantage 
(McGrath, 2013) the commitment to CRE would be kept 
short term because change occurs frequently.
Hypothesis 1: The length of commitment to CRE will 
reduce over time to reflect improved CRE flexibility and 
effectiveness of CRE use.
Shorter leases should provide the most flexible option 
for a business with low total commitment (Apgar, 2009). 
This hypothesis is operationalized in terms of three sub-
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a: The length of lease terms >5 years will 
fall.
Ownership provides a fixed cost (Apgar, 2009) and 
studies on the owned:leased ratio (e.g. Lasfer, 2007) indi-
cate that owning CRE affects shareholder returns.
Hypothesis 1b: The ownership of CRE will fall over 
time.
Different industries have different profiles of owner-
ship and leasing. Therefore, a further indicator of CRE 
change is the total CRE commitment, and this would re-
move any bias on ‘ownership’ preference for a category. 
Reducing costs, in its broadest sense improves financial 
performance (Lindholm et al., 2006a).
Hypothesis 1c: The total commitment to CRE will fall 
over time.
The financial crisis and recession affected turnover, 
profits and profit margins, thereby impacting performance 
measures of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. If 
there was a flexible CRE portfolio there should have been 
an appropriate response to reduce the total CRE commit-
ment and allow a rebalancing of input costs to restore pro-
ductivity measures, possibly with a time lag. Therefore, to 
maintain efficiency, effectiveness and productivity levels a 
business will look at revenue and profitability and adjust 
its CRE, consequently the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: As turnover and profitability decline/
increase a business will react by reducing/increasing the 
proportion of total costs committed to CRE.
Hypothesis 2a: The financial commitment to CRE will 
fall/increase as revenue and/or profits decline/increase.
Hypothesis 2b: The financial commitment to CRE will 
fall/increase as the profit margin declines/increases.
As a business adjusts to demand for its products or 
services it will change its various resource inputs, includ-
ing the number of full time employees (FTE), which will 
affect its space requirement and producing a correspond-
ing contraction or expansion in the CRE portfolio. That 
will allow the business to maintain levels of efficiency, ef-
fectiveness and productivity in its operations.
Hypothesis 3: As FTE numbers increase or decrease 
there will be a corresponding change to the CRE portfolio.
Hypothesis 3a: CRE total costs will decline/increase as 
FTE numbers decline/increase.
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When revenue/profit contract there will be an FTE re-
duction leading to a decline in CRE needs. Leased space 
should be easier to reduce than owned space, therefore 
there should be an initial jump in the ratio of owned to 
lease space when FTE declines.
Hypothesis 3b: As FTE numbers decline/increase the 
ratio of owned to leased CRE costs will increase/decrease.
As more output is being sought from less input to en-
hance productivity from increased efficiency, there should 
be a decline over time in the CRE costs relative to FTE 
numbers.
Hypothesis 3c: CRE lease costs will decline over time 
relative to FTE numbers.
The next section explains how the data were gathered 
and analysed to test these hypotheses.
3. Methodology
This research examines the financial data of companies in 
the UK’s FTSE350 Index, the largest companies by mar-
ket capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
for the period 2007 to 2014, the financial crisis, recession 
and post-recession period. Following an initial analysis 
those companies that did not have accounts for the entire 
research period together with those non-typical in their 
use of real estate were excluded. The latter includes invest-
ment funds (vehicles run by banks), property companies 
(whose raison d’être is ownership) and natural resource 
companies (who focus on working land to remove miner-
als, etc.), resulting in data for 230 companies.
The companies were grouped into four CRE catego-
ries – Services & Technology, Manufacturing, Miscellane-
ous and Retail. Information on CRE in the annual reports 
does not provide a breakdown of property types, therefore 
these categories will not be exclusively property type spe-
cific. For example, whilst the Services & Technology cat-
egory will primarily comprise offices, it will also include 
other property types (e.g. retail banking premises and data 
centres). The quality of the data on financial cost of CRE 
in UK quoted companies is very good as UK account-
ing is governed by the International Accounting Stand-
ards Board (IASB), and the standards they issue provide 
a benchmark for the quality of the data in the accounts 
of individual companies, providing robust and reliable in-
formation for investors. The lack of a breakdown between 
property types and omission of data such as floor areas is 
recognised as a limitation of the data.
The data was extracted from annual reports, which 
were downloaded from the individual company websites. 
The year-end figures comprised turnover, profit before in-
terest & tax, net book value (freehold and long leasehold), 
surplus property provision (SPP), operating lease costs 
and FTE’s. The SPP is made by a company for leases of 
>1 year remaining that are no longer operational, in effect 
it is a capital sum set aside to pay for the liability (IAS37, 
2001). Lease costs are split in the accounts between those 
of <1 year, 2−5 years and >5 years.
Four calculations were undertaken on the extracted 
data to create additional variables:
 – Total CRE costs – the summation of net book value 
and operating lease costs to give a view of the total 
commitment to CRE. The figure used in this paper 
reflects just the lease rent commitment and the net 
book value. It does not include other costs (e.g. ser-
vice charge, property taxes, facilities costs) which 
are not stated in the annual reports. It is estimated 
that rent represents circa 35% of the total financial 
commitment for CRE (Cooke & Appel-Meulenbroek, 
2015);
 – Owned:Leased Ratio – the net book value divided by 
the total CRE costs. It provides a view on the balance 
of owned and leased CRE;
 – Lease length >5 years – an estimate of the lease term 
for leases >5 years to give an overview of the lon-
gevity of the leased portfolio. The calculation is the 
total cost for leases >5 years divided by the average 
annual rent. The latter is the sum of leases <1 year 
and 2−5 years, divided by 5. For example, a rent of 
£200 m with the average annual rent of £49m pro-
duces a figure of 4.08 as the average term >5 years, 
indicating a predicted term for longer leases of 9.08 
years (5+4.08);
 – Profit Margin – profit expressed as a percentage of 
turnover.
Two analysis techniques were used. The first is a de-
scriptive to put the dataset and categories into context 
including trends over the eight-year period. Mean values 
were calculated for business and CRE metrics being the 
category total divided by the number of companies.
The primary technique is a distributed time lag auto-
regression model to determine trend lines and the effects 
the independent variables have on the dependent variable. 
The nature of both the acquisition and disposal processes 
for CRE results in a slow speed of change, which leads 
to a lag between the decision and its implementation. A 
one-year lag reflects change of performance over 12 to 
24 months impacting the CRE portfolio. A two-year lag 
would, in part, be a de-facto sign there is a lack of dynamic 
alignment in the portfolio. Whilst a business will monitor 
its performance on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, its 
decision-makers will only react once a specific trend has 
clearly developed, at that point change to the CRE portfo-
lio will commence. Therefore, a one-year lag for the inde-
pendent variables in the regression analysis was adopted.
The regression models were estimated for each cat-
egory and all companies combined. The independent 
variables include the previous year’s value of the depend-
ent variable (the auto-regressions term), together with 
dummy variables for each year of the data, where the first 
year is taken as the basis. The dummy variables capture 
any year-specific effects, whereas the regression con-
stant and auto-regression term pick up the general trend. 
A number of models look at trend-lines and only include 
as independent variables the auto-regression term and 
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the dummy variables for the years. To establish whether 
the estimated value of the auto-regression coefficient in a 
trend-line reflects a fall or increase overall the predicted 
values have been computed using the regression model for 
the different categories against each year for Hypothesis 1.
Other models test the relationship between the de-
pendent variable and the business metrics. In these mod-
els the business metric is included as an independent vari-
able along with the auto-regression term and the dummy 
variables. A correlation test was undertaken to identify 
multicollinearity between variables before a regression 
analysis was run, with the correlation threshold set at 0.7. 
Regressions were run for the individual variables against 
the dependent variable and the one with the highest R2 
(Adjusted) was selected. A check was made on the VIF 
to confirm the previous process had dealt with all of the 
collinearity issues. Throughout we have identified signifi-
cance in tables by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
4. Results – descriptives
A brief summary of the key financial and CRE data, rep-
resented as mean per company, is shown in Table 1. The 
change in the key financial measures from 2007 to 2014 
are shown in Figures 1 to 5, which have rebased the data 
to 2007 as 100 to show the relative change over the period.
There has been a relatively muted change over the pe-
riod for measures for All Companies (Figure 1) with two 
exceptions. Profits fell significantly in 2008, recovered by 
2010 and have been relatively flat since ending 4% below 
the 2007 level. Turnover has shown some variability over 
the period ending 45% higher than the start, but that rise 
has not been continual.
Figure 2 shows the measures for Services & Tech-
nology with both turnover and profits relatively volatile. 
A significant change in 2008 saw turnover fall by 21% and 
profits by 118%, creating losses. Turnover has recovered 
but profits struggled to regain the 2007 level ending 12% 
below their 2007 level.
Manufacturing (Figure 3) has probably been the 
strongest category over the period with growth in turno-
ver, rising 48%, and profits, up 51%. The mean SPP per 
Manufacturing company proportionately grew the most 
of all categories, although from a relatively small absolute 
figure.
Profits for the Miscellaneous category 2014 were 28% 
below their 2007 level, in spite of a near doubling of turno-
ver (Figure 4). This category had the largest percentage 
increase in SPP, although it fell from a peak in 2012.
The profits of retailers dropped in 2009 by 20%, a year 
later than other categories (Figure 5). Profits rallied in 
2011/2012 before declining to end 1% below their 2007 
level. In financial terms the SPP per retailer was 60% high-
er than the mean for the next highest category, Services 
& Technology. The SPP profile showed unusual volatility 
between 2010 to 2012.
Table 1. Mean values per company of some key variables (2014)
Measure Value Change2007−2014 Measure Value
Change
2007−2014
All companies 230 companies
Turnover £5,522m 47% Freehold value £797m 22%
Profit £475m −4% SPP £17m 145%
FTE’s 27,842 11% Lease total £544m 17%
Services & technology 108 companies: finance (39); construction (15); professional & support services (29); technology,  
media & telecommunications (25)
Turnover £5,575m 34% Freehold value £177m −4%
Profit £486m −12% SPP £25m 150%
FTE’s 30,944 11% Lease total £420m 4%
Manufacturing 54 companies: consumer goods (15); engineering (26); industrials (13)
Turnover £3,730m 48% Freehold value £1,666m 28%
Profit £514m 51% SPP £3m 200%
FTE’s 18,768 8% Lease total £189m 41%
Miscellaneous 45 companies: health (12); leisure (8); transport (8); utilities (7)
Turnover £6,579m 95% Freehold value £687m 9%
Profit £465m −28% SPP £6m 133%
FTE’s 22,755 13% Lease total £354m 18%
Retail 23 companies
Turnover £7,417m 36% Freehold value £1,888m 39%
Profit £345m −1% SPP £40m 135%
FTE’s 45,268 13% Lease total £2,330m 26%
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Figure 1. Key financial measures for all companies
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Figure 3. Key financial measures for manufacturing
Figure 4. Key financial measures for miscellaneous
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5. Results and discussion of hypothesis testing
We will now turn to the stated hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
A regression analysis tested Hypothesis 1a, that the lease 
length >5 years was reducing over time. The purpose of 
the regression analysis here is to identify a trend, con-
sequently no independent variables are included in the 
model other than the auto-regression term, the previ-
ous year of the dependent variable, and the dummies for 
years. A regression model is estimated for each category 
and all companies. The results of the regression analysis 
are shown in Table 2.
The predicted average lease term >5 years have been 
calculated for the period 2008 to 2014 (Figure 6).
There is an overall upward trend in leases >5 years 
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Figure 6. Predicted values (years) of length of long-term 
commitment to CRE (Hypothesis 1a)
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Retail with a significant drop in 2009 before being rela-
tively flat for the remainder of the period. The dip coin-
cides with the doubling of the SPP (see Figure 5). The fit 
of the data to the regression equation is relatively high (R2 
(Adjusted) is between 0.681 and 0.837). Hypothesis 1a is 
not supported because the length of leases >5 years has 
risen for all categories, excluding Retail.
The descriptive analysis shows an increase in owner-
ship of CRE for all categories, except Services & Technol-
ogy (−4%). To test Hypothesis 1b trend-line regression 
models are estimated for the categories with total owned 
CRE as the dependent variable and previous year value of 
owned CRE and the dummies for the years as independ-
ent variables. The results are shown in Table 3.
To evaluate the trend, predicted values for each year 
were calculated by the regression model for each year and 
each category (Figure 7). This identified that Services & 
Technology and Miscellaneous categories had declined by 
15% and 12% respectively, whilst for the other three cate-
gories ownership is increasing, with Retail highest (+26%). 
The very high R2 (Adjusted) suggests a very good fit to the 
data. The analysis does not support Hypothesis 1b, owner-
ship is increasing for three of the categories, not declining.
Total CRE costs continued to increase through the re-
cession starting to fall from 2011 and 2012. The descrip-
tive analysis showed increases for all categories (Services 
& Technology +4%; Manufacturing +41%; Miscellaneous 

















All companies (R2 0.710; R2adj 0.709, P < 0.01)
Estimate 3.187 0.664*** −0.692 −0.533 −0.324 0.115 −0.234 −0.137
t-value 8.050 62.316 −1.317 −1.013 −0.616 0.218 −0.444 −0.260
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.311 0.538 0.827 0.657 0.795
Services & technology (R2 0.681; R2adj 0.678, P < 0.01)
Estimate 2.942 0.683*** −0.539 −0.972 −0.730 −0.045 −0.860 −0.328
t-value 5.465 39.532 −0.766 −1.381 −1.035 −0.064 −1.219 −0.464
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.444 0.168 0.301 0.949 0.223 0.643
Manufacturing (R2 0.837; R2adj 0.834, P < 0.01)
Estimate −0.753 1.008*** 0.354 1.059** 0.626 0.999** 1.033** 0.890**
t-value −2.003 43.419 0.789 2.358 1.396 2.228 2.305 1.986
p-value 0.046 0.000 0.430 0.019 0.164 0.026 0.022 0.048
Miscellaneous (R2 0.776; R2adj 0.771, P < 0.01)
Estimate 1.521 0.801*** 0.938 −0.292 0.893 0.934 1.070 0.326
t-value 1.455 32.585 0.673 −0.209 0.640 0.669 0.767 0.233
p-value 0.147 0.000 0.502 0.834 0.523 0.504 0.444 0.816
Retail (R2 0.738; R2adj 0.726, P < 0.01)
Estimate 9.058 0.501*** −6.642*** −3.236 −3.565 −3.397 −3.756 −3.869*
t-value 5.198 19.948 −2.886 −1.395 −1.536 −1.462 −1.616 −1.663
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.165 0.127 0.146 0.108 0.098
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
+19%; Retail +26% and All Companies +17%). To test Hy-
pothesis 1c a trend-line regression analysis of total CRE 
costs was conducted using as independent variables the 
dummies for the years and the previous year’s value of 
total CRE cost. The results are represented in Table 4.
The predicted values from the equations are shown in 
Figure 8 the R2 (Adjusted) figure being close to 1.0, similar 
to Hypothesis 1b. The trend line for total costs of CRE 
generally indicates a steady rise over the eight years for 
Retail (+33%), Manufacturing (+21%) and All Companies 
(+22%). In contrast, Services & Technology and Miscel-
laneous both declined, falling 14% and 4% respectively. 
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Table 3. Results of trend-line regression analysis of owned CRE (Hypothesis 1b)











All companies (R2 0.992; R2adj 0.992, P < 0.01)
Estimate 51.486 1.028*** −53.739*** −61.077*** −56.406*** −60.215*** −71.218*** −68.277***
t-value 5.277 438.547 −3.912 −4.446 −4.106 −4.383 −5.184 −4.970
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Services & technology (R2 0.970; R2adj 0.969, P < 0.01)
Estimate 49.545 0.973*** −53.687*** −49.425*** −51.865*** −53.061*** −58.867*** −49.192***
t-value 4.865 154.345 −3.752 −3.454 −3.625 −3.709 −4.115 −3.438
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing (R2 0.955; R2adj 0.954, P < 0.01)
Estimate 69.675 1.016*** −69.308*** −70.531*** −53.459*** −75.066*** −71.316*** −90.866***
t-value 4.849 88.487 −3.452 −3.513 −2.662 −3.736 −3.549 −4.522
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
Miscellaneous (R2 0.985; R2adj 0.985, P < 0.01)
Estimate 66.582 0.979*** −55.906** −57.590** −33.598 −43.688 −78.159*** −37.706
t-value 3.249 142.260 −1.973 −2.033 −1.186 −1.542 −2.759 −1.331
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.049 0.043 0.237 0.124 0.006 0.184
Retail (R2 0.995; R2adj 0.995, P < 0.01)
Estimate 88.808 1.039*** 4.155 −87.590 −119.073 −81.124 −107.625 −163.729*
t-value 1.389 183.335 0.046 −0.976 −1.326 −0.903 −1.198 −1.823
p-value 0.167 0.000 0.963 0.331 0.187 0.368 0.233 0.070
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
Table 4. Results of trend-line regression analysis of total CRE cost (Hypothesis 1c)













All companies (R2 0.990; R2adj 0.990, P < 0.01)
Estimate 84.339 1.034*** −81.315*** −97.417*** −92.473*** −115.175*** −149.577*** −134.648***
t-value 4.280 389.825 −2.937 −3.519 −3.340 −4.160 −5.402 −4.863
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Services & technology (R2 0.997; R2adj 0.977, P < 0.01)
Estimate 112.956 0.976*** −90.335*** −94.742*** −103.304*** −120.385*** −147.802*** −117.210***
t-value 4.796 177.546 −2.738 −2.871 −3.131 −3.648 −4.479 −3.552
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing (R2 0.970; R2adj 0.969, P < 0.01)
Estimate 89.441 1.032*** −100.166*** −88.539*** −61.431** −102.159*** −124.641*** −105.043***
t-value 4.411 108.803 −3.535 −3.125 −2.168 −3.602 −4.395 −3.705
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
Miscellaneous (R2 0.981; R2adj 0.981, P < 0.01)
Estimate 70.893 0.993*** −66.039 −47.279 −33.025 −45.312 −86.557** −51.330
t-value 2.599 127.306 −1.775 −1.271 −0.888 −1.218 -2.326 −1.379
p-value 0.010 0.000 0.077 0.205 0.375 0.224 0.021 0.169
Retail (R2 0.993; R2adj 0.992, P < 0.01)
Estimate 150.642 1.050*** 3.115 −204.918 −207.129 −235.706 −324.429* −450.115**
t-value 1.072 143.608 0.016 −1.046 −1.057 −1.203 −1.655 −2.297
p-value 0.285 0.000 0.987 0.297 0.292 0.231 0.100 0.023
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
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Hypothesis 1c is not supported as the total commitment 
to CRE is increasing for three of the five categories.
Consequently, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Certain 
categories are seeing a decline in some CRE commitment 
measures but overall CRE commitment is not reducing 
over time. This suggests no improvement in flexibility nor 
in CRE effectiveness.
The increase in lease costs might not be the result of 
expansion of the amount of leased CRE held. The five-
year upwards only rent review pattern in the UK could 
account for part or all of the change. In which case the 
increase in lease costs would be outside the control of the 
occupier. However, the combination of the significant in-
crease in the SPP together with the increase in lease costs 
suggests restructuring of the portfolio might be occurring. 
The increase in lease cost probably reflects additional and/
or better and/or more expensive space being taken to re-
place properties no longer appropriate for the business. 
The rise in the SPP indicates closing of properties before 
lease expiry.
A reduction in lease length would build flexibility into 
the leased portfolio, however this metric only declined 
for the Retail category and that was only a nominal fall. 
This suggests that any improved lease negotiating position 
for occupiers during the recession was short lived, post-
recession landlords have returned to seeking longer leases.
The increase in CRE ownership could reflect the view 
that owning is better than leasing (Gibson, 2000). Howev-
er, the change in the ownership balance may be a reflection 
of opportunism arising from the recession. The property 
investment market was depressed after the financial crisis 
and into the recession. Banks and lenders forced compa-
nies to sell properties to reduce debt. Banks themselves 
became forced sellers as a number of property companies 
became insolvent, therefore low prices offered opportuni-
ties for occupiers to purchase properties cheaply.
The analysis suggests that businesses have not achieved 
greater flexibility and/or improved effectiveness (getting 
more from less) in its CRE portfolio. This could indicate 
that CRE strategies are not just about cost reduction as 
suggested by some (e.g. Gibson & Lizieri, 2001; Stadlhofer, 
2010).
Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis examines the total commitment to CRE 
against the business metrics of profit, turnover and profit 
margin, all of which exhibited considerable variation over 
the eight years reflecting the impact of the financial cri-
sis and recession. A positive relationship is hypothesized 
such that when turnover and/or profit and/or profit mar-
gin falls/rises the CRE commitment will decline/increase. 
Therefore, the hypothesis encompasses single metric or 
combinations of them.
The regression analyses of total CRE costs was carried 
out for Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 3a. It included the independ-
ent variables of turnover, profit, profit margin and FTE, to-
gether with their previous year figures, as well as the pre-
vious year total CRE cost (the auto-regression term) and 
dummies for the years. This approach allows us to control 
for FTE in evaluating the effects of financial performance 
variables (for Hypothesis 2) and, vice versa, to control for 
the financial performance variables in evaluating the effects 
of FTE. Ideally, we wanted to include all business metrics 
simultaneously, but because of multicollinearity we have not 
been able to do this. The procedure for selection of the best 
variable is explained in the methodology. The results show-
ing the best metric based on fit are shown in Table 5.
The regression for Hypothesis 2a identifies a signifi-
cant positive relationship of total CRE cost with turnover 
for the Services & Technology and Retail categories and 
with profit for Miscellaneous but a negative relationship 
for Manufacturing. A significant positive relationship ex-
ists for Services & Technology between total CRE cost and 
the previous year profit, which corresponds to a negative 
relationship in the current year. Consequently, Hypothesis 
2a is only supported for certain cases.
Hypothesis 2b regression identified a significant posi-
tive relationship between total CRE costs and profit mar-
gin for the Retail category. The previous year profit margin 
is significant and positive for All Companies, correspond-
ing to a negative relationship in the current year. There-
fore, Hypothesis 2b is only supported in certain cases.
A positive relationship between total CRE costs and 
turnover and/or profit and/or profit margin would indicate 
that CRE moves in line with business performance. Across 
all three metrics the relationships are not consistent with this 
hypothesis. The significant positive relationships that support 
the hypotheses are turnover for both Services & Technology 
and Retail, profit for Miscellaneous and profit margin for 
Retail. Hypothesis 2 is supported for certain measures, indi-
cating an element of dynamic alignment, but not a consistent 
one. This suggests that businesses have not created flexibility 
in their CRE to facilitate portfolio adjustment when financial 
performance necessitates cost reduction.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 examines the commitment to CRE rela-
tive to FTE. The absolute change in CRE commitment 
per FTE varies across categories, a decline in Services 
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& Technology (−9%), static in Miscellaneous (−0.6%) 
and rising for All Companies (+8%), Retail (+16%) and 
Manufacturing (+20%). CRE commitment per FTE also 
exhibits considerable variety, Services & Technology is 
the lowest at £19,289, Miscellaneous (£45,741), All Com-
panies (£48,032), Retail (£93,170) and Manufacturing 
(£98,754).
The results of the regression analysis for Hypothesis 
3a for FTE in Table 5 indicates that FTE has a significant 
(positive) effect on total CRE costs for All Companies 
only. Hypothesis 3a is supported at the portfolio level only.
For this Hypothesis 3b a regression analysis with the 
owned:leased ratio as the dependent variable was carried 
out with FTE as the independent variable. The results are 
shown in Table 6. FTE does not have a significant effect 
on the owned:leased ratio and Hypothesis 3b is not sup-
ported.
The regression analysis of total CRE lease costs was 
carried out for Hypothesis 3c with independent variables 
of the previous year’s lease total, FTE, previous year FTE 
and dummies for the years. The results of the regression 
analysis are in Table 7.
The regression analysis of FTE, as the independent 
variable, and lease total, the dependent variable, indicates 
a significant negative relationship for Manufacturing and 
a positive one for All Companies, Services & Technology 
and Retail. Hypothesis 3c is not supported, lease costs are 
not declining against FTE over time, with the exception 
of the Manufacturing category. Hypothesis 3 is only sup-
ported in limited cases and lacks consistency across the 
sub-hypotheses.
Over the eight-year period there was not a decline in 
lease costs relative to FTE, with the exception of Manu-
facturing. In that category lease costs and FTE both in-
creased, the latter at a quicker rate resulting in a small 
decline of lease costs per FTE. Elsewhere the increase in 
people appears to have been translated in to a requirement 
for more space with the growth in the CRE metrics higher 
than in FTE numbers. This could reflect more space per 
person and/or more expensive space being taken. A ques-
tion to consider is whether the same pattern exists rela-
tive to floor space, which the financial accounts do not 
provide.
One aspect of the recession in the UK that drew con-
siderable comment at the time was the relatively small 
decline in employment levels through the recession. Busi-
nesses appear to have retained employees rather than 
reduce numbers when turnover and/or profits fell. This 
has been cited as a reason for poor improvement in UK 
productivity post-recession (Guardian, 2016). The lack of 
interaction between FTE numbers and CRE costs could 
suggest that business has been more focussed on the re-
tention and development of talent compared to improving 
efficiency in their CRE portfolio.
Table 6. Results of regression analysis of owned:leased ratio (Hypothesis 3b)













All companies (R2 0.936; R2adj 0.936, P < 0.01)
Estimate 0.019 0.963*** 0.000 −0.002 −0.010 −0.002 −0.003 0.002 −0.002
t-value 3.297 153.121 −0.129 −0.299 −1.331 −0.280 −0.392 0.305 −0.333
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.897 0.765 0.183 0.780 0.695 0.761 0.739
Services & technology (R2 0.890; R2adj 0.889, P < 0.01)
Estimate 0.023 0.937*** 0.000 −0.012 −0.009 −0.008 −0.011 0.003 −0.004
t-value 2.565 77.707 0.046 −0.959 −0.765 −0.694 −0.877 0.236 −0.321
p-value 0.011 0.000 0.963 0.338 0.445 0.488 0.381 0.813 0.748
Manufacturing (R2 0.905; R2adj 0.903, P < 0.01)
Estimate 0.046 0.936*** 0.000 0.004 −0.027** −0.006 −0.008 0.001 −0.006
t-value 3.405 59.125 0.878 0.327 −1.996 −0.449 −0.590 0.064 −0.486
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.381 0.744 0.047 0.654 0.556 0.949 0.627
Miscellaneous (R2 0.946; R2adj 0.944, P < 0.01)
Estimate 0.013 0.967*** 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.010 −0.003
t-value 0.943 70.545 0.366 0.410 0.205 0.635 0.974 0.607 −0.184
p-value 0.346 0.000 0.715 0.682 0.838 0.526 0.331 0.544 0.854
Retail (R2 0.955; R2adj 0.953, P < 0.01)
Estimate 0.003 0.964*** 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.013 0.008 −0.012 0.017
t-value 0.224 49.708 0.248 0.648 0.131 0.785 0.510 −0.724 1.007
p-value 0.823 0.000 0.804 0.518 0.896 0.434 0.611 0.470 0.316
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
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Conclusions
The period 2007−2014 was one of volatility for business in 
the UK. By 2014 revenue had grown by 45%, but profit-
ability remained below the 2007 level. Certain categories 
performed better than others, with Services & Technol-
ogy and Miscellaneous categories the poorest performers. 
Against that backdrop both CRE and surplus property 
commitments grew, SPP increasing by 145%.
The findings suggest that businesses do not appear to 
have focussed on improving efficiency, effectiveness and 
productivity by working their CRE portfolio harder and 
using less space for more people. Rather they appear to 
have nurtured the workforce by improving the quality 
and/or quantity of CRE. In this study, we have focused on 
the actual relationship between various business (turno-
ver, profit, profit margin and employee numbers) and CRE 
metrics (leases >5 years, ownership and total CRE costs). 
In particular, it has sought to identify evidence that busi-
nesses have incorporated dynamic alignment into their 
CRE. This would facilitate adjustment of CRE to changed 
operational requirements and improve efficiency, effec-
tiveness and productivity measures. That evidence has not 
been found other than in limited cases.
The limited dynamic alignment capability identified by 
the study could reflect the inertia in the CRE portfolio, 
acting as a drag on change. Extensive change to an exist-
ing inflexible CRE portfolio will be expensive and disrup-
tive, it needs to evolve rather than undergo an immediate 
radical change. Alternatively, this could be that CRE is not 
seen as anything other than a cost (as identified by Gibson 
& Lizieri, 2001), therefore it does not receive adequate at-
tention. This appears incompatible with the opinion that 
CRE is an asset of the business and CRE teams are mov-
ing from providing tactical to strategic advice (Joroff & 
Becker, 2017). What this study does demonstrate is that 
cost reduction is not an apparent strategy. If it was there 
would be a significant reduction in the metrics of lease 
total, ownership cost and the total CRE commitment over 
the study period. Nor does the concept of agility appear 
to have become embedded in the mind-set of occupiers 
(Joroff & Becker, 2017), otherwise there would have been 
a noticeable decline in lease length profiles.
The results showed evidence of dynamic alignment, but 
not in the way that theory suggested. The results suggest 
a more complex set of relationships rather than a simple 
cause and effect one, underpinning the view that a busi-
ness (including its CRE) is a complex adaptive system 
(Reeves et  al., 2016). What is apparent is that there has 
not been a significant adjustment to CRE strategy reflect-
ing adoption of transient competitive advantage (McGrath, 
2013) or blue ocean strategy (Kim & Maugborgne, 2015). 
Even if the business strategy remains as sustained com-
petitive advantage (Porter, 1985) it is essential to have a 
dynamic alignment capability for the CRE. It is possible 
that decision makers have not adapted to the changed 
Table 7. Results of regression analysis of lease total (Hypothesis 3c)













All companies (R2 0.982; R2adj 0.982, P < 0.01)
Estimate 34.193 1.013*** 0.000*** −26.303 −34.386* −34.090* −52.688*** −75.660*** −64.607***
t-value 2.569 263.060 4.632 −1.416 −1.851 −1.835 −2.836 −4.073 −3.478
p-value 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.064 0.067 0.005 0.000 0.001
Services & technology (R2 0.975; R2adj 0.974, P < 0.01)
Estimate 61.202 0.971*** 0.000* −36.374 −44.904* −51.179** −67.194*** −88.696*** −68.162***
t-value 3.361 159.752 1.931 −1.431 −1.767 −2.014 −2.644 −3.490 −2.682
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.054 0.153 0.078 0.044 0.008 0.001 0.007
Manufacturing (R2 0.955; R2adj 0.954, P < 0.01)
Estimate 28.299 1.111*** −0.001*** −32.319* −19.265 −10.210 −30.268* −56.189*** −15.265
t-value 2.260 59.144 -3.757 −1.872 −1.116 −0.591 −1.750 −3.249 −0.884
p-value 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.265 0.555 0.081 0.001 0.377
Miscellaneous (R2 0.956; R2adj 0.955, P < 0.01)
Estimate 8.056 1.011*** 0.000 −9.619 10.807 0.551 −1.582 −8.396 −14.189
t-value 0.521 77.768 −0.107 −0.465 0.522 0.027 −0.076 −0.406 −0.685
p-value 0.603 0.000 0.915 0.642 0.602 0.979 0.939 0.685 0.494
Retail (R2 0.990; R2adj 0.990, P < 0.01)
Estimate 63.117 0.931*** 0.006*** 12.282 −84.515 −49.394 −109.297 −159.515 −234.223**
t-value 0.842 56.982 8.366 0.119 −0.816 −0.476 −1.054 −1.537 −2.257
p-value 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.906 0.416 0.634 0.294 0.126 0.025
Significance * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01
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business environment and adjusted their thought process 
commensurately. Understanding what decision-makers 
thoughts are in this respect would prove a useful study, 
both at the business level and for CRE. Alternatively, a 
more dynamic business strategy has been adopted, but 
dynamic alignment requirements has not been applied 
to CRE and its decision-making process. The theories 
of alignment of CRE to business strategy (e.g. Lindholm 
et al., 2006a) assumed a one-off not a continual process. 
That indicated a disconnect between the CRE and busi-
ness strategy, this disconnect could be the reason for the 
omission of a dynamic alignment capability. What is re-
quired is continual adjustment of the CRE resulting in 
a complex iterative process that is emergent rather than 
deliberate single change.
This paper has sought to ascertain whether occupi-
ers have built dynamic alignment capability into their 
CRE portfolio. The resultant flexibility enabling them to 
improve the efficiency, effectiveness and productivity of 
the portfolio and therefore the business itself. That agility 
would facilitate adjustment to future shocks to the organi-
sation and from changes of business strategy. This research 
has identified mixed evidence of increased flexibility, but it 
is not a clear and unambiguous trend. Importantly it has 
closed a gap in the research by looking at what businesses 
actually did through a period of considerable change.
Several implications arise for those in practice from 
this study, in both business and CRE. The overarching 
point is how business and CRE inter-relate. In particular 
there is a need for a composite approach that builds dy-
namic alignment in to the CRE portfolio to avoid fettering 
the business in the medium to long term with unwanted 
CRE. The change to the accounting reporting standards 
that take affect 1st January 2019 (IFRS16, 2016) may fa-
cilitate an improvement in future CRE agility. It will influ-
ence business and CRE metrics, consequently both busi-
ness and CRE managers should be creating CRE flexibility 
ahead of their implementation. The bigger picture has to 
be a CRE portfolio that allows business to grasp transient 
opportunities and not be hampered by a fixed CRE profile 
and cost base.
Limitations and recommendations for further 
research
The effect of CRE slowing down change to strategy has 
been flagged for some time (e.g. Weatherhead, 1997). Fur-
ther study is needed on why business has not built in flex-
ibility to their CRE over the last 20 years generally, but in 
particular since the recession commenced in 2008. There 
is a need to identify and understand why building CRE 
dynamic alignment through flexibility has not become a 
priority in the decision-making process. The study of CRE 
in Australia by Willis (2008) offers a potential insight, in 
that 56% of those dealing with CRE did not know what 
CRE flexibility was and 76% had CRE time horizons of 
> 5 years. If a similar approach existed in the UK it could 
explain the lack of dynamic alignment capability.
Another influencing factor on the results found in 
this study could be the sample itself. These are quoted 
companies and generally long established consequently 
their ability to change direction may be limited in both 
extent and speed by factors such as management struc-
ture and providing shareholder returns. This study exam-
ines the net effects of decision-making, it does not look at 
the process itself. It is probable that changes to turnover, 
profit, profit margin and FTE will have been considered 
when CRE decisions were made. What is not known is the 
weighting applied to individual measures and knowledge 
of that is an important area for further research.
The results show that categories that are more narrow-
ly defined by property type and/or business sector, such as 
Retail, appear to produce clearer result patterns than more 
diverse ones (e.g. Services & Technology). The aggregation 
into larger categories may not have been beneficial in that 
context, therefore analysis at a more granular business sec-
tor level may improve clarity. The approach to decision-
making may be more consistent within business sector 
rather than across property types. The downside of such 
an analysis could be small sample sizes, but nonetheless 
an exercise worth undertaking. A further line of research 
would be to extend the dataset forward into the post-re-
cession period, a less volatile business environment, which 
may provide different insights into CRE adjustment.
Miscellaneous is a diverse category of both business 
sectors and property types. That might result in specific 
trends for business type being masked. For example, both 
Transport and Utilities are not typical CRE users, with 
large amounts of CRE relative to employees, as well as 
unusual property types, such as bus depots and reservoirs. 
Analysis by business sector should identify whether this is 
an issue and whether any should be treated as non-typical. 
A solution to some of these limitations would be to extend 
the sample size beyond the 230 companies in the FTSE350 
and look at a greater variety of companies, not only those 
quoted but also those owned privately or through private 
equity vehicles, as well as those outside the UK.
Financial analysis provides one perspective of what has 
happened, which in itself is a limitation of the study. The 
data was drawn from published reports and those reports 
provide limited information. Ideally more specific detail of 
the CRE portfolio would help in the analysis.
The trend from the mid-1990’s to 2003 of sale-and-
leaseback’s, especially in the UK, could be an explanation 
for the lack of flexibility. That process sought to release 
capital to support the core business and had the benefit 
that the total cost of the rent did not impact the balance 
sheet. That changes in January 2019 (IFRS16, 2016) when 
new accounting regulations will bring all leases on to the 
balance sheet. Whilst various studies (e.g. Rodriguez & 
Sirmans, 1996) have identified the shorter-term benefits 
of sale-and-leasebacks, there do not appear to be any 
studies that look at the long-term effects. A comparison 
between those companies that undertook sale-and-lease-
backs and those who did not could be insightful. Which 
should include questioning whether the reduction in 
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owned CRE and increase in long term lease commitment 
impacted CRE as a strategic long-term resource (Park & 
Glascock, 2010).
The increase in CRE ownership could reflect an op-
portunistic approach during a depressed point in the 
property cycle. Understanding the perception of deci-
sion makers of the merits of lease versus own would be a 
beneficial study area, together with a trying to determine 
whether there is an ideal balance between owning and 
leasing. Previous work (e.g. Lasfer, 2007) did consider an 
element of this but carrying out a detailed investigation 
of what organisations did and why would provide useful 
for CRE researchers.
Various CRE alignment models (e.g. Gibler & Lind-
holm, 2012) have held that the overriding objective of the 
business is to maximise shareholder wealth. The output 
of this study suggests that this does not necessarily hold 
true. It might be that the time horizon business decision-
makers use is longer than the eight-year period of this 
survey. However, that would seem counter intuitive for 
quoted companies with performance announcements on 
a three-monthly cycle. Therefore, an implication of this 
study is that CRE alignment models need to question this 
underlying assumption and the one-off process of align-
ment. Further research should look at creating alignment 
models based on an iterative process and the theory of 
complex adaptive systems (Reeves et al., 2016). This study 
indicates that CRE remains inflexible with long time ho-
rizons and the move to agile portfolios (Joroff & Becker, 
2017) has not been achieved everywhere.
One aspect of the study has been to identify the sig-
nificant increase in the SPP across the categories. The SPP 
may have been used as a mechanism to build ‘flexibility’ 
in to the leasehold portfolio. Understanding the relation-
ships, if any, between business measures, CRE metrics and 
the SPP may cast light on this point.
Without a dynamic alignment CRE capability there is 
a risk of adverse effects on performance. There have been 
studies on business performance (e.g. Neely & Bourne, 
2000) and on CRE performance (e.g. Riratanaphong & 
Van der Voordt, 2015) but there does not appear to have 
been a study that considers the impact of CRE on business 
performance measures and vice-versa. To conclude, there 
is still a lot more research necessary to support manage-
ment in being able to truly provide CRE agility.
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